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Politicizing Patents: Patenting Biotechnology in
the Wake of Section 33, Prometheus, and CLS Bank
Jonathan Stroud, AmerIcan UnIversIty WashIngton College of Law
It is characteristic of the military mentality that nonhuman factors . . . are held essential, while the human being, his
desires, and thoughts. . . are considered as unimportant and secondary . . . . The individual is degraded . . . to ‘human
material.’
–

Albert Einstein

I. INTRODUCTION
1

For the first time, there is a statutory limitation on patentable subject matter in the United States. The limitation is a late
2
addition to the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011. It reads in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
3
no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Pro-life advocates added it to the end
of the AIA bill at § 33(a).
4

Section 101 of the Patent Act, the foremost statute governing patent law, defines patentable subject matter as:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
5
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The only previous exceptions to this broad grant of patentability were the judicially recognized exceptions of law of nature,
6
7
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. The new exception took effect immediately following the Act’s signing.
By recognizing a vague subject-matter exception for human organisms despite the fact that internal policies had long
militated against such patent claims, Congress has politicized the patent law to an unheard-of degree. While textually
consistent with internal United States Patent and Trademark (USPTO) policy, the passage of § 33 should not be seen as
an invitation to litigators to expand § 101 unpatentable subject-matter challenges to cover validity by including arguments
that medical methods, genetic tests, biological chimeras, or emerging cell and tissue therapies are now unpatentable in
light of recent Court decisions.
8

9

The express Congressional legislative purpose, the history surrounding the section, and preexisting and subsequent
10
case law (particularly the Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., and CLS Bank International v.
11
Alice Corp. cases) serve to narrowly tailor the exception to only very rare circumstances, such as attempts to patent
12
human clones or human offspring for unethical, unsafe, or unconstitutional purposes.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Patent and Trademark Office should:

•

Work quickly to reinforce their longstanding narrow view of the human-subject-matter exception by issuing
further memoranda, amending the MPEP, and maintaining that view in court;

•

Ensure examination standards do not change by instituting training for the patent examination corps;

•

Combat any overreaching use of § 33 in conjunction with related § 101 doctrines, such as the obviousnessplus-natural-law analysis applied in Prometheus, by issuing guidance to all PTAB judges to narrowly
construe § 33.
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1

This Article shows that the statutory ban on the issuance of patents encompassing human organisms merely codified the
longstanding policy of both the courts and the USPTO to deny patentability of claims that encompass an entire human
being. It did not limit the preexisting scope of patentable subject matter, and therefore should not disturb longstanding
precedent, procedure, or practice. The USPTO should act quickly to quash any suggestion otherwise, and issue guidance
13
to its Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to maintain the longstanding limited application of the exception. Further,
administrative law principles require courts to exercise Auer deference to the USPTO’s informed reading. Consequently,
litigators, legislators, and the courts should not attempt to expand the scope of § 33 as broader evidence of patent
invalidity. Finally, the USPTO should train examiners to narrowly apply § 33 to avoid blocking innovation, to preserve
patent rights, and to accurately reflect Congressional intent.

2

Part I gives a brief background on the case law surrounding the patentability of living things, and analyzes the political
history of the Weldon Amendment, Prometheus, and CLS Bank. Part II analyzes § 33 and discusses different approaches
to implementation. Part III makes recommendations based on administrative law principles, arguing that § 33 should be
narrowly construed to avoid blocking necessary innovation and keeping patent examination nonpolitical and scientifically
based.

A. A Brief History of Living Subject Matter
I.

Diamond v. Chakabarty – Living Subject Matter is Patentable

The founding fathers recognized the value of a patent system and charged Congress, in the text of the Constitution, “[t]o
promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
14
Discoveries.”
The First Congress responded almost immediately by passing the Patent Act, holding that “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
15
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”
Thus, the
broad grant was limited prospectively only by a few judicially recognized exceptions, namely laws of nature, natural
16
phenomena, and abstract ideas.
17

Prior to the growth of the biotechnology industry in the 1970s, the question of the patentability of living subject matter was
little explored. In 1873, the USPTO issued the first widely recognized American patent for a living thing to Louis Pasteur
18
for purified yeast, defining it as an article of manufacture under § 101.
Similarly, in the nineteenth century, the United
States and manufacturers developed and used viral vaccines and antitoxins, on which patents issued. There was never
19
any serious question concerning its patentability.
However, with the growth of the biotechnology industry in the 1970s
20
following the development of recombinant DNA techniques, as well as the rise in cultural relevance of both dystopian
21
22
genetic engineering, science fiction, and the abortion rights debate, the Supreme Court was forced to confront whether
man could generally patent living subject matter.
In 1980, the Court answered by ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that bioengineered living organisms are patentable
23
subject matter. The Court held that bacteria engineered to be beneficial in cleaning up oil spills was altered enough that
24
it deserved patent protection.

II.

The Quigg Memo and Longstanding USPTO Policy

Following the Chakrabarty decision, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) wrestled with the question of
the patentability of other emerging forms of biotechnology. In 1987, the USPTO circulated the “Quigg Memo,” stating that:
“The Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms,
including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101 . . . A claim directed to or including
25
within its scope a human being will not be considered patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101.”
It based its
26
reasoning, in part, on the 13th Amendment ban on slavery, and may have been a reaction to the attempted patenting of
27
human embryos.
Furthermore, the Quigg Memo states that any claim directed to “a non-plant multicellular organism
28
which would include a human being within its scope include the limitation ‘nonhuman’ to avoid this ground of rejection.”
Federal Courts upheld the Quigg Memo as a valid exercise of the USPTO’s statutory authority under administrative law
29
principles.
The USPTO’s longstanding policy has been to reject patents only for claims clearly involving “entire” or “complete” human
beings; it has largely granted patents on living tissue, genetically modified cells, and other emerging forms of
biotechnology. For instance, the USPTO has long held that isolated human genes — segments of human genes that have
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30

been excised, with non-important parts spliced out, and then isolated in the laboratory—are patentable, and thousands of
31
32
gene isolation patents have issued over the years.
Likewise, the USPTO has issued patents on surgical techniques
33
and autologous heart valves, and may soon receive patent applications on complete, genetically-modified human
34
organs.

3

The USPTO policy is also contained in an “official media advisory” issued on April 2, 1998 in response to negative news
coverage concerning a patent application directed to a human/non-human chimera. There, the USPTO claimed that patent
“inventions directed to human/non-human chimera could, under certain circumstances, not be patentable because, among
35
other things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement.” This is fascinating,
as it is the first time the USPTO relied on morality or public policy to dictate the boundaries of patentable subject matter.
The USPTO policy is now contained in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2105 under the heading
“Patentable Subject Matter.” The MPEP states that the USPTO:
“would now consider nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms,
including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101. If the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a
human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 must be made indicating that the
36
claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.”
37

The USPTO, however, is supposed to be morally neutral on the merits of the patents it issues, as it is merely
38
implementing the technical requirements of the patent statutes. Thus, the only limits on patentability are those that are
39
40
41
Constitutional, statutory, or judicially imposed.

III.

The Weldon Amendment

Historically, Congress has considered legislation banning a variety of subject matter, from patentability of business method
42
43
The American Bar Association’s Intellectual
patents to patentability of surgical and other medical procedure patents.
Property Section, among others, has long-counseled against any form of limitation on patentability and argued against
44
each one of these proposed exceptions.
In the past, conservative activists have tried and failed to amend the patent law to expressly exclude the patentability of
45
human life.
Perhaps as a compromise or an alternative way to get such an amendment passed, in 2004, thenRepresentative David Weldon proposed a different kind of amendment—to the appropriations bill—that would prevent
46
funding the USPTO if it issued any patents directed to or “encompassing” a living human via the appropriations process.
In effect, the USPTO was allowed to issue such a patent, despite their policy against doing so; they simply could not use
agency funds to issue said patent.
According to Representative Weldon’s remarks, the language of his funding ban precludes only the patenting of full human
organisms at a stage of development, and did not expand the scope or severity of the USPTO’s longstanding practice
47
denying such patents on moral grounds.
Further, the limitation was not intended to conflict whatsoever with a § 101
48
patentability analysis. Thus, by this limited logic, practitioners could simply avoid it by including the word “nonhuman” in
any questionable claim.
49

The American Bar Association’s Intellectual Property Section convened a Special Committee to assess the funding ban,
and came out vigorously against it. In contrast, in a letter to the Congress from then-USPTO Director and Bush appointee
James Rogan, the USPTO endorsed the amendment primarily because it indicated that it did not “alter the longstanding”
USPTO policy on the unpatentability of full human life forms.

IV.

Section 33 – Patenting Humans

Section 33 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) reads in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of
50
law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”
51

It had immediate effect and applies to all applications still pending on the date of passage of the AIA, but includes a
saving provision indicating that it “shall not affect the validity of any patent issued on an application” not pending on, or filed
52
after, the date in question.
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Thus, it will not take effect until the patents currently pending or yet to be applied-for are subject to examination,
reexamination, post-grant review, inter parties review, eventual litigation, and/or appeals. It does immediately affect Patent
Examiners’ patentability analyses on Requests for Continued Examination, divisionals, and continuations, as the text
indicates it applies to all applications “pending” on the date of passage.

4

53

The legislative history of § 33 narrowly cabins its application.
The Congressional Record includes Representative
Weldon’s many speeches from 2003 stating that his amendment “simply reaffirms current U.S. patent policy,” that it “would
not interfere in any way with any existing patents with respect to stem cells,” that it would “not forbid funding research on
embryonic stem cells, because a human embryo is an ‘organism’ but a stem cell clearly is not,” and, most importantly, it
quoted a letter stating that the USPTO “viewed the Weldon amendment as fully consistent with USPTO’s policy on the
54
non-patentabiliy of human life-forms.”
In nearly immediate response to the passage of the AIA and § 33, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination
55
Policy Robert W. Bahr issued a memorandum to the USPTO Patent Examining Corps (Bahr memo). In it, he indicated
that § 33 “of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act does not change existing law or long-standing PTO policy that a claim
encompassing a human being is not patentable . . . Thus, § 33(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act codifies existing
56
PTO policy,” similar to the exact language of the original Quigg Memo, which was upheld by the Federal Circuit in 1991
57
as a valid exercise of the PTO’s authority.
That longstanding policy is found at MPEP § 2105, which states that: “If the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claimed invention as a whole encompasses a human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 must be made indicating
58
that the claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.” Additionally, the Bahr memo and MPEP suggest a
form paragraph that examiners use in rejecting such a claim, invoking § 33(a) as the basis for the rejection as “directed to
59
or encompassing a human organism.”
Thus, the legislative history, the Bahr memo, and the MPEP purport to cabin the scope of § 33’s codification of the Weldon
Amendment’s codification to just that: the longstanding USPTO position that entire human beings are unpatentable, but
that § 33 would not affect any other related patents, such as heart valves, tissue engineering, bioengineered organisms, or
60
somatic stem cell treatments.

II. THE PROBLEM: REINVIGORATING SECTION 101 JURISPRUDENCE
Excluding only “complete human beings” would thus support the validity of all cellular-level biotechnology patents.
Examples of long-patented tissue-engineered devices include heart valves, skin grafts, bioengineered artery or vein
61
62
replacements, hair follicles, human blood protein therapies like synthetic erythropoietin, and perhaps, in the near future,
63
entire tissue-engineered replacement organs.
Problematically, the pace of biotechnology has outgrown our limited understanding of the difference between human and
nonhuman cellular creations. For instance, patents have long issued on autologous heart valves that have been removed
from patients, chemically preserved and strengthened through a process called crosslinking, and reimplanted in other
64
patients (thus extending those patients’ lives by years).
In another example, Amgen has long patented Epogen—
65
synthetic human erythropoietin, a key blood component.
Recently, with the discovery and creation of the first-ever artificial life form, a cell constructed entirely from tiny DNA
66
building-blocks, new questions of patentability are emerging faster than an already-gridlocked Congress and USPTO can
deal with. Thus, it is in the best interest of Congress, the general public, and the patent-holders in this country to
necessarily view § 101 as a “coarse filter” generally unaffected by § 33.
Some scholars have argued that the Weldon amendment, and thus § 33 as well, preclude the patentability of
67
human/animal chimeras.
While this is technically correct—some legislative history evidences the Office’s intent to
prevent the patenting of fully realized human/animal hybrids—the argument misconstrues the scope of the term “chimera,”
which encompasses many valuable experimental cell and tissue technologies.
Additionally, the use of the term “chimera” risks a play to emotion, evokes science fiction horror stories, and obfuscates the
real issue: preventing Constitutional abuse of the patent system while ensuring innovation and broad patent protection for
68
important technological industries.
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The agency’s decision to regulate menu labeling in such a broad manner was controversial. Following the publication of
the rule, several members of Congress wrote letters to FDA urging it to adopt the alternative, which narrowed the range of
69
establishments regulated.
The House Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee also weighed in with report language
70
expressing concerns over the rule.

5

Several months before the rule was published, President Obama issued Executive Order 13563, which reiterated the
principles of Executive Order 12866 stating that each agency must: (1) issue regulations only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits justify the costs; (2) tailor regulations to impose the least burden on society; and (3) select
approaches that maximize net benefits. The Administration has been called upon to ensure these principles are applied to
71
the menu labeling rule.
The supermarket industry has estimated that food retailers face a greater than $1 billion regulatory burden in the first year
72
of compliance with the proposed rule, and hundreds of millions of dollars annually thereafter. The implications of whether
the FDA has authority to regulate supermarkets as restaurants are immense. The manner in which the Administration
enforces Executive Order 13563 has similarly high stakes.

Ill. THE SOLUTION: DEPOLITICIZING PATENTS
A. The Agency Continues to Have No Substantive Authority After AIA
As noted recently in the Administrative Law Review by Professor James Miller, the USPTO, as an Office tasked only with
the procedural requirements of implementing examination procedures, lacks the substantive authority to issue binding
73
74
substantive rules. Courts agree: in the string of cases known popularly as the Tafas decisions, the federal courts struck
75
down a promulgated rule package as outside of the Office’s substantive authority.
Normally, a federal agency would
receive Chevron deference for its construction of a statute governing the substance of its mission, so-called because of the
76
famous Chevron v. NRDC decision. Yet, courts have held the USPTO has no substantive rulemaking authority and thus
77
they deserve no Chevron deference whatsoever.

B. Auer Deference Should Apply to Internally Consistent Interpretations
78

However, in another seminal administrative law case, Auer v. Robbins,
the Supreme Court established that when an
79
agency is reviewing its own promulgated regulations, courts should grant it greater deference than even Chevron.
In
evaluating an agency’s interpretation, the courts will apply a deferential “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
80
Scholars analyzed empirical evidence of reversal rates
regulations” standard unless the regulation is plain on its face.
based on the type of administrative deference courts apply, and determined that only Auer deference is truly more
81
deferential than other standards.
Here, we have a reverse-parroting issue: the statute adopted the identical language that has been contained in informal
82
USPTO practice manuals and procedures for years.
While the language of the statute on its face is ambiguous (what
constitutes “comprising,” for instance?) the regulatory history is abundantly clear. Auer made no mention of an agency’s
substantive rulemaking authority—and here, no greater substantive authority is needed to invoke Auer. Indeed, by
adopting the USPTO’s own interpretation into statute, Congress has given that interpretation regulatory authority and life of
its own.

C. Any New Form of Technology Unanticipated by the Weldon Amendment Should Survive Its
Application
Perhaps decisively, the Federal Circuit upheld that very interpretation in 1991 as within the USPTO’s substantive authority,
83
calling it “interpretive.” If that seems tautological, it is; the PTO should be free to interpret the statute as consistent with
its prior interpretation. There is no reason to think that Auer deference would not apply to the USPTO’s interpretation of its
own longstanding interpretation, particularly one that has been so carefully limited in the legislative history, the original
memo, the Weldon amendment, the MPEP, and in the text of § 33 itself. Thus, Auer deference should apply and the Court
should defer to the agency’s view that § 33 does not apply to technologies like cellular and tissue engineering, autologous
84
implants, transplants, and other forms of modified human tissue.
85

When the Quigg Memo issued in 1988, it purported to explain the USPTO’s application of Diamond v. Chakabarty. The
Weldon amendment, in turn, only suggested it was codifying the Quigg Memo and longstanding USPTO policy. In turn, §
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33 simply adopted into statute the USPTO’s own longstanding policy. Thus, to construe it, as the agency has in their most
86
recent memo, they look to their own preexisting regulations. The memo reads: “This provision of the Leahy–Smith
America Invents Act does not change existing law or long-standing PTO policy that a claim encompassing a human being
87
is not patentable . . . Thus, section 33(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act codifies existing PTO policy.”
That
longstanding policy is found at MPEP § 2105, which states that: “If the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed
invention as a whole encompasses a human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 must be made indicating that the
claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.” Thus, Auer deference is appropriate. It would likewise be
appropriate to any training materials, memoranda, or guidance the USPTO would issue governing § 33’s application and
scope. Thus, it serves to reinforce the policy directive that the USPTO should issue guidance, memoranda, and training to
the PTAB judges and the Examination Corps, and amend the MPEP to reflect this narrow view.

6

D. Prometheus Applies Very Limitedly to Manifestly Abstract Ideas, Not Statutory Exceptions
In Prometheus, the unanimous Court found that a diagnostic method patent dealing with the pharmacokinetic relationship
88
between blood and drugs was invalid under § 101 because it “set forth mere laws of nature.” It held that even patents
89
Thus, the Supreme Court endorsed a “law-ofthat apply so-called natural laws using known processes are invalid.
nature-plus-obviousness” test for patentable subject matter, where any mathematical equation or natural relationship
90
(regardless of novelty) that is applied using an obvious methodology is invalid under § 101.
The Court agreed with the argument that if it allows patent protection over the body’s natural response to drugs, then “the
result will be a vast thicket of exclusive rights over the use of critical scientific data that must remain widely available if
91
physicians are to provide sound medical care.” Thus, petitioners believed a “future preemption” argument had emerged,
92
and have begun to argue this to the Federal Circuit.
93

The Federal Circuit, however, responded with force in CLS Bank.
In the first § 101 case decided since Prometheus, a
94
divided Federal Circuit panel rejected any limits to their prior precedent from the Supreme Court’s § 101 approach.
Judge Linn, writing for the majority, applied a newfound standard, holding that “when . . . it is not manifestly evident that a
95
claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea” a § 101 challenge fails. He went on to add that “[u]nless the single
most reasonable understanding is that a claim is directed to nothing more than a fundamental truth or disembodied
concept, with no limitations in the claim attaching that idea to a specific application,” a claim will survive a § 101
96
challenge.
Applying the “manifestly evident” standard reinforces limiting the expansion of § 33 beyond the limitations introduced in the
legislative history, the USPTO’s interpretations, and the USPTO’s history of utilizing the Weldon amendment and the Quigg
Memo.
97

A hybrid natural-law-plus-obviousness analysis post-Prometheus should not be possible in conjunction with an express
98
statutory exception. The Federal Circuit foreclosed such a reading in CLS Bank.
In the future, litigants and appellees
may try to argue that when claims encompassing part of a human body are modified by obvious methodology, they are
therefore unpatentable after Prometheus. This would conflate Prometheus’ natural-law-plus-obvious analysis with an
unduly broad reading of § 33 and should be avoided.
Patents to genetic isolation methods; patents directed to the pharmacokinetic relationship between the body; and drugs,
surgical techniques, and autologous implants extracted from the human body, modified, and transplanted to another,
should all be exempt from § 33’s reach. Accordingly, the USPTO should institute Examiner training, amend MPEP
guidance, and memoranda to the PTAB and the Examination Corps reinforcing this view. Only then can the true
Congressional purpose be realized and can proper deference be granted to the longstanding USPTO policy, which has
merely been codified into statute.

IV. CONCLUSION
The USPTO should provide clear, express guidance to both examiners and PTAB judges in an attempt to keep the first
statutory exemption for patentable subject matter appropriately narrow. It should use guidance, internal memoranda,
training sessions, policy meetings, and dialogue with the federal courts and outside stakeholders to combat any attempted
overreach of § 33 in conjunction with other related § 101 doctrines, such as the obviousness-plus-natural-law analysis
found in Prometheus. Lastly, it should amend the MPEP accordingly. This will ensure innovation, certainty, and
profitability in the lucrative and promising area of biotechnology, guaranteeing that the United States remains competitive
in the international market. It is not the province of the Patent and Trademark Office, or patent law, to become embroiled
in a political conflict that is irrelevant to innovation.
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